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Hungarian–Russian relations have changed considerably during the last decade. Until the mid-
2000s, it had been a limited and cautious relationship with many reservations on both sides. 
Hungary had a high FDI/GDP ratio with heavy reliance on EU markets, thus curtailing the 
Russian share in foreign trade and investments. The political landscape had the traditional for 
CEE societies left-right divide regarding relations with Moscow, based on the dichotomy of 
“pragmatist” leftist parties and skeptical conservatives. The return to the Eastern markets 
(“Eastern opening”) was the focus of the former, while political and security threats were 
accentuated in the latter’s discourses. Energy dependence remained a sensitive issue, with 
sporadic Russian hostile takeover attempts in the sector repulsed by the governments with bi-
partisan political support. 
In 2017, Hungary’s Russia policy assumed a significantly different profile. By far the biggest 
factor in this policy turn has been the ruling majority giving up their objections against closer 
ties with Russia. Viktor Orbán, the leader of this majority, and a former staunch critic of Russia 
for two decades, has refashioned himself into one of Moscow’s most vocal defenders in the 
midst of its war in eastern Ukraine. While in opposition, Mr. Orbán criticized the government 
in 2008 on the grounds that he would not want to see Hungary become the “happiest barrack of 
Gazprom,”2 but concluded a huge nuclear deal with Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear energy 
corporation, while in government in 2014. Mr. Orbán’s party, Fidesz, has become the party 
supported by the most pro-Russian voters in the Hungarian political landscape.3 The right-wing 
radical Jobbik, Hungary’s second-strongest political formation according to opinion polls, has 
denounced what it sees as Fidesz’s pro-European stance and favors even deeper engagement 
with Moscow – a historically unprecedented orientation in Hungary’s nationalist political 
segment.  
The unexpected shift toward pro-Russian foreign policy requires a deeper investigation. 
Russian influence has many variations throughout the CEE region. In Poland, the Law and 
Justice party, albeit being anti-liberal, adopted an even more hostile stance toward Russia. At 
first sight, Hungary seems to be a showcase of interaction between the deterioration of 
democratic standards and growing Russian influence. However, unlike in Bulgaria or Serbia, 
Moscow does not have a strong economic or institutional foothold in Hungary. With the 
exception of Jobbik, Russia neither had major grassroots projects of influence, nor visible 
ownership in the local economy. Its presence in terms of gas and oil imports has been declining 
fast since 2008 and bilateral foreign trade has suffered a serious drop after 2014 and the 
imposition of EU sanctions against Russia. Russian influence shows little signs of having a 
bottom-up design with traditional state capture by Russia’s local business partners and 
influential middlemen, deeply entrenched in local elites. The government and the country is 
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firmly in Viktor Orbán’s grip and there is little chance to bypass him or create a fait accompli 
in any major issues. 
In reality, Russia’s influence in Hungary primarily rests on elite relations. Moscow 
approached directly the top decision makers and strengthened its influence only in a number of 
selected, albeit strategic, fields. In these areas, it succeeded in putting its leverage on a long-
term footing and preventing the realization of other policy outcomes. Energy was the showcase 
of this process. The South Stream gas pipeline project led to a major policy rivalry with the 
Nabucco pipeline after 2007. Gazprom’s price concessions formed a key platform for a utility 
rate cut pledge, which aided Orbán’s electoral campaign in 2013 and cemented his re-election 
in 2014. The deal to construct new units at Hungary’s Paks Nuclear Power Plant (Paks II), 
signed in January 2014, determines the nuclear energy sector and partially even the financial 
landscape in the country for the next decade.  
Against this background, this chapter will demonstrate how Russian energy statecraft 
worked in the case of Hungary. Russia used sectoral asymmetries in bilateral energy relations 
to achieve non-sectoral outcomes. The Kremlin employed the energy question as an agenda-
setting issue with specific benchmarks of negotiation. At the same time, Moscow also used 
energy to engage and create asymmetrical commitments vis-à-vis Hungary, transferring its 
energy influence to other policy fields.  
 
 
The Russian economic footprint in Hungary 
 
As in many other CEE states, Russia used to be the biggest non-EU trading partner for Hungary 
prior to 2014. Nonetheless, exports to Russia constituted only 1.3% of the Hungarian GDP in 
2016 (peaking at 2.6% in 2010). In terms of commodity structure, the difference from West 
European patterns is small. Manufactured goods, machinery, and transport equipment provide 
the bulk of the volume, most of it in the form of re-exports of products by foreign multinationals 
operating in Hungary. Agricultural products, foods, and beverages contributed a relatively low 
share – 12.1% of the total in 2016. This is also a strong indication of the limited role sanctions 
and counter-sanctions politics have played in influencing export performance. The Russian 
crisis after 2014 hit the bilateral export levels hard – they fell by 43% between 2013 and 2016 
(in euro terms). Nevertheless, the overall effect on Hungarian exports was much smaller as 
goods were presumably easily redirected to other markets. Consequently, total Hungarian 
exports actually grew by more than 10% in the same period.  
Hungary’s imports from Russia, on the other hand, consist almost exclusively of mineral 
fuels, predominantly oil and gas. According to official statistics, their share was only 1.7% of 
GDP in 2016. Given the high number of intermediaries and indirect imports, their actual share 
must have been closer to the total oil and gas imports – 3.6% of GDP (7.9% in 2013). Internal 
energy demand in Hungary decreased gradually after 2009, especially in the case of natural gas, 
contributing to the fall in import volumes. Bilateral trade balance has been traditionally passive, 
but with a diminishing trajectory. The deficit peaked in 2008 amounting to 3.9% of GDP, while 
in 2016 it reached only 0.8% (even when oil and gas imports officially registered as non-
Russian are added, the indicator remains well below 2%). The negative trade balance has lost 
much of its significance because since 2010 total Hungarian foreign trade has been in a solid 
surplus position, well above 5% of GDP. This is in contrast to the period prior to the 2008–
2009 financial crisis when the country had to cope with major financial imbalances, including 
a negative foreign trade balance.  
Statistics on Russian FDI in Hungary show only a few major transactions, particularly the 
unsuccessful takeover attempt of the Hungarian oil and gas company Mol Nyrt by 
Surgutneftegaz, Russia’s third-largest oil producer, and several deals connected to the 
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Rahimkulov family. Except for these deals significantly affecting Russian FDI flow and/or 
stock data, in statistical terms Russian presence has remained low both from the point of view 
of Russia as well as of Hungary.  
Mostly because of de jure or de facto tax havens and offshore centers intermediating Russian 
FDI, official FDI statistics on the basis of the immediate host/investing country provided by the 
central banks of Hungary and Russia deliver different perspectives of the 2010s. For the end of 
2015, the Russian central bank shows that Russian FDI stock totaled USD 230 million,44 
compared to Hungarian central bank’s EUR 46.4 million. For 2009 and 2010, two outlier years 
due to Surgutneftegaz’s takeover attempt of Mol, Russia’s share still accounted for only 1.6% 
and 2.2%, respectively, of Hungary’s total inward FDI stock. Measured as a share of GDP, 
Russia reached a share of 1.2% and 1.5%, although one of the highest FDI flows that Hungary 
received in 2009 came from Russia.5 According to the Russian calculations, at the end of 2009 
and 2010 Hungary’s share in total Russian outward FDI stock did not exceed 0.8%. At the end 
of 2016, it was only 0.06%, putting Hungary in 11th place among 16 CEE countries.6 
In Hungary, there is no publicly available accurate data on the total number of companies 
with Russian capital. Citing unnamed Russian sources – but essentially just reiterating 
information that had already been circulated by its predecessor ITD Hungary – both the 
Hungarian Investment and Trade Agency and the Russian trade representation claimed that over 
2,000 joint ventures with Russian ownership were operating in Hungary. In contrast, according 
to Eurostat methodology, there were only 166 Russian-controlled enterprises in Hungary in 
2014, while 3,534 Russian-controlled enterprises operated in the EU, compared to 265,000 
foreign-controlled enterprises.7 These data do not include all the companies with Russian 
involvement. The share of Russian-controlled enterprises in the number of foreign-controlled 
enterprises in Hungary was only 0.91% in 2014, making an almost invisible 0.03% contribution 
in terms of the total number of enterprises in Hungary. The shares of Russian affiliates in the 
total turnover and the number of persons employed of all foreign affiliates in Hungary in 2014 
were of similarly low proportions, amounting to 0.51% and 0.12%, respectively.8 A detailed 
survey of corporate registry statistics shows that the revenues controlled by Russian companies 
had shrunk from the peak of 4.9% of the total revenues in the economy in 2008 down to 0.07% 
in 2015.  
Apart from Russia’s presence in the energy sector, there are only a limited number of other 
important, Russian-owned assets. In Hungary, there have only been two Russian-owned banks, 
including, in the past, the General Banking and Trust (ÁÉB), and now Sberbank Hungary, a 
subsidiary of the Russian state-owned Sberbank. Sberbank Hungary targets Russian private and 
corporate clients’ trade between the CEE and CIS countries.9 Press reports suggest that Moscow 
leaders were not altogether satisfied with the prevailing state of affairs at the bank and the media 
regularly float a potential exit from Hungary. The 8.5% stake (with a voting power of 8.6%) of 
the Rahimkulov family in Hungary’s leading retail bank, OTP Bank Nyrt, considered a portfolio 
investment and estimated at 0.5% of Hungary’s GDP, is also worth mentioning, as it constitutes 
by far the biggest item on the list of Russian investments in Hungary. OTP Bank is the largest 
Hungarian domestic bank, the main holding of Hungary’s most influential businessman, Sándor 
Csányi. His interests stretch from Mol to the agricultural industry, multiplying the importance 
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of the Russian market for his empire (not mentioning OTP’s investments in Russia). 
Nonetheless, Sándor Csányi’s control over OTP is undisputable.  
Besides energy and banking, a large Russian (and also Ukrainian) industrial investment in 
Hungary is the ISD Dunaferr steel plant. At the end of 2003, Dunaferr was tendered and bought 
by a consortium, consisting of Ukraine’s Industrial Union of Donbass (ISD) and the Swiss 
Duferco International Trading Holding Ltd. Severstal also submitted a bid. However, a change 
of ownership occurred in late 2009, when Russian investors obtained a stake of 50% plus two 
shares in the metallurgical assets of ISD. After that, as a creditor, Russia’s state-owned 
Vnesheconombank practically controlled ISD. The European steel industry and, in particular, 
Dunaferr have been struggling since the 2008–2009 crisis. In 2013, a cost optimization program 
was announced. Reacting to this news, the Hungarian government offered to buy ISD Dunaferr, 
but the proposal was declined. Consequently, the fate of the company has become a sensitive 
political issue.  
Vnesheconombank is a prevalent mediator and investor in Hungarian-Russian relations. It 
bought a significant share in the national airline Malév. After the latter’s bankruptcy in 2011, it 
unsuccessfully sued to get back its EUR 112 million credit from the Hungarian government. 
Reportedly, it keeps trying to litigate a bilateral arrangement with Budapest.  
In the Hungarian machine-building industry, in light of Paks II, the most relevant company 
with Russian involvement is Ganz Engineering and Energetics Machinery, owned by TsKBM, 
a part of Rosatom’s machine-building division Atomenergomash. The activities of Uraltrak are 
also related to the machine industry – it is the only official Hungarian dealer of Russia’s 
Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant – Uraltrak, owned by the Russian state-owned Uralvagonzavod. 
Another relatively wide-known Russia-owned company is LIT Budapest that deals with 
disinfection technologies, including the use of UV in the purification of drinking water, 
wastewater, technological water, and water for swimming pools and spas. Russia’s LIT is 
reportedly among the world’s top three developers and manufacturers of UV systems for water, 
air, and surface disinfection.  
The reasons for the low Russian FDI activity are manifold. Hungary had a relatively swift 
economic transformation and an extensive privatization process, including in some major 
segments of the energy sector in the 1990s. Key positions in the national economy had already 
been occupied by private companies by the late 1990s when – with a couple of exceptions10 – 
the first Russian actors capable of investing abroad consolidated themselves. By the late 1990s, 
Hungary had almost fully privatized its economy. In the energy sector, the emergence of a 
domestic private company, Mol, played a crucial role in pushing back Russian investment 
efforts. In turn, Prime Minister Orbán’s recent drive for renationalization partly explains his 
limited openness to new Russian FDI. The Hungarian government has recently bought back a 
high number of energy assets from Western investors, and it would like to keep these for the 
long term. Furthermore, the Russian capacity for new investments has been diminished by the 
2008–2009 financial crisis and, more recently, by low oil prices and Western sanctions against 
Russia. Consequently, FDI may now even constitute a less accentuated part of Russian 
influence in Hungary than prior to 2008. 
 
 
Effects of Russia’s economic footprint on Hungarian governance and decision-making 
 
Unlike in other former communist countries in Europe and the former Soviet Union, deliberate 
Russian influence-building started relatively late in Hungary and in the rest of the Visegrád 
Group. Consequently, Moscow had to enter an established local economic and political 
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landscape, where the transition process had already ended and new systemic actors and 
relationships were in place. Due to the late consolidation of the Russian economy in the early 
2000s, its oligarchs failed to penetrate Visegrád markets. Russia’s economic resources were 
insufficient to compete with the high shares of Western FDI and the solid economic 
performance of these nations. At the same time, Moscow also enjoyed some benefits of its late 
arrival. First, the very limited presence saved its image in terms of nation-building. While in 
Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, the fight against Russian influence was a rallying factor in 
some political discourses, in Hungary it was the Western influence and multinationals that took 
the “enemy of the nation” role in radical public narratives. Second, Russian influence has been 
built in a more strategic-political context from the very beginning. Ownership, trade, or 
economic considerations formed a much more instrumental role and Russia’s actions had a 
broader set of targets.  
In this light, it would be misleading to assess Russian influence only through the traditional 
variables of measurement. The relational portfolio consists of various elements, where 
indicators of FDI or shares in foreign trade alone do not reveal the nature and the magnitude of 
the Russian footprint. An illustrative case is the Russian 10-billion-euro credit line for the Paks 
II project. While it cannot be incorporated in any of the above-mentioned sets of indicators, its 
sheer size is roughly three times bigger than the highest estimates for total Russian-related 
investments in Hungary. If Hungary fully utilizes this credit line, it will create a direct 
government-to-government channel on a liability equal to 10% of Hungarian GDP. Similarly, 
the status of the long-term gas supply contract (LTSC) as well as its form, duration, and other 
conditions may signal highly different policy relations and outcomes. Thus, a broader look at 
these non-conventional indicators of economic presence is warranted.  
Russian economic influence is not a wholesale phenomenon. The fundamentals of the 
Hungarian economy have not changed during the term of Mr. Orbán’s government – they rest 
on a massive presence of Western multinationals and deep integration into European value 
chains. Russian capital in the region was not a match to these Western affiliates. Nevertheless, 
Russian capabilities and Mr. Orbán cabinet’s receptiveness intersected in the energy sector. The 
government’s wish to renationalize and control the utilities and trader activities, to get access 
to their financial flows and to use energy prices in a populist manner for electoral purposes was 
a major window of opportunity for Moscow. Thus, the internal transformation of the energy 
sector interwove with the increasing Russian presence. Moscow could effectively engage the 
Mr. Orbán government through this branch and not only maintain, but even significantly 
increase the set of deep, long-lasting and interlocking positions. Energy was one of the drivers 
of bilateral rapprochement. Yet, Moscow did not aim to acquire ownership of or direct control 
in the Hungarian sector by all means unlike in the case of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Latvia. This 
was neither possible due to local renationalization trends, nor necessary. It tried to consolidate 
its energy leverage in times of a changing energy landscape through major arrangements and 
potentially transfer its influence beyond the sector. This can be characterized as a sort of energy 
statecraft, whereby Russia aims to establish a self-supporting presence in Hungarian energy and 
extend it to other fields. Russia’s newborn energy statecraft in Hungary has four main features. 
First, the relationship in the energy sector is based on a growing number of large-scale and 
long-term arrangements bearing high corruption and management risks.11 Some of these risks 
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are general: energy usually comprises oligopolistic market designs;12 delivered products are 
sometimes very complex (like nuclear);13 in some cases these relations are bilateral monopolies, 
reducing the applicability of market-based solutions and resulting in distributive games;14 and 
informational asymmetry in these cases favors the supplier’s side.15 Nonetheless, the Hungarian 
side entered these arrangements – such as South Stream, the gas LTSC or Paks II – voluntarily.  
Second, the Hungarian energy landscape went through a major renationalization campaign, 
changing the bargaining power and the nature of negotiations substantially. The former role of 
foreign multinationals has been taken by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In the gas industry, 
in 2013, state-owned MVM (Hungarian Electricity Works) purchased the gas wholesaler from 
Germany’s E.ON, holding the LTSC.16 South Stream Hungary, a former joint venture to build 
the Hungarian section of South Stream, had been permanently held by various state-owned 
entities since its founding in 2008, bypassing the privately owned gas transmission operator 
(TSO), FGSZ. The Paks II project has been directly controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office, 
taking it entirely out of the corporate environment. Indeed, state ownership in the energy sector 
can be beneficial in particular cases. It may improve the international bargaining position, ease 
the process of capital and resource allocation, and utilize synergies at complex projects with 
industrial policy overspills or with a sensitive technology content.17 At the same time, 
considerations related to social welfare take a more sizeable role in the activities of SOEs,18 
managerial decisions are often vulnerable in politicized environments, and economic efficiency 
and political power relations have to be taken into account simultaneously.19 This may 
frequently offer inroads for political patronage and rent-seeking behavior, while principal-agent 
corruption schemes can be set up much more easily. Furthermore, in the Hungarian case, the 
renationalization of the gas sector increased the informational asymmetry with Russia, since 
there had been no gas companies and sectoral know-how in state ownership until 2010. Given 
Fidesz’s concept of “political governance,” the nationalization process also implied a more 
direct subordination of technocratic and economic considerations to political concerns.  
Third, the Russian-related segments have taken the dominant role in energy investments, 
handicapping alternative energy market outcomes. This is primarily the result of the Paks II 
project swallowing up almost all accessible public funds in the generation of energy in the years 
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16 Hungary has two LTSCs, both of them with Gazprom Export, Gazprom’s export arm. The major one is with 
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period 2008–2028, a tiny contract has been entered into with Centrex Hungary, an affiliate of the Gazprombank-
owned and Vienna-based Centrex Europe Energy & Gas AG. When talking about the Hungarian LTSC, the authors 
refer to the major one. 
17 Raymond Vernon. 1979. “The International Aspects of State-Owned Enterprises,” Journal of International 
Business Studies 10, no. 3: 7–15. 
18 Yair Aharoni. 2000. “The Performance of State-Owned Enterprises,” in The Rise and Fall of State-Owned 
Enterprise in the Western World, edited by Pierangelo Maria Toninelli. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 49–73. 
Dieter Bös. 1981. Economic Theory of Public Enterprise. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
19 Spiros Lioukas, Dimitris Buorantas, and Vassilis Papadakis. 1993. “Managerial Autonomy 
of State-Owned Enterprises: Determining Factors,” Organization Science 4, no. 4: 645–666. 
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to come. Public funds play an even more important role in the sector due to the shrinking 
activities of private investors and companies. Populist measures and the regulatory squeeze 
have minimized utility tariffs, leading energy companies into the red. Investments in the 
electricity and gas sectors have crumbled, falling from 1.06% to 0.17% of GDP between 2010 
and 2016.20 Coupled with the extensive and highly selective regulatory practices, practically no 
investments can be made on a private basis and almost all activities are concentrated in the 
SOEs.  
Fourth, the government’s thinking rests on the conviction that the current quid pro quo basis 
of the bilateral relations is beneficial for Hungary. This belief is rooted in the government’s 
foreign policy concept that sets economic and business considerations as the primary focus for 
diplomacy. In 2014, Prime Minister Orbán announced his goal to increase the share of non-EU 
countries to one-third in total exports by 2018. Political, security, and “Western civilizational” 
aspects are downsized in the new mindset.21 Furthermore, the government’s anti-liberal, harsh 
Eurosceptic rhetoric has been perceived as a potential bargaining chip vis-à-vis Moscow. Russia 
is taken as a “strong buyer” of these criticisms, an actor who is ready to monetize and provide 
economic benefits in exchange of political friendship and non-conformity with the EU and 
NATO. Thus, it is reasonable to think that the Hungarian government would like to increase its 
Russian portfolio and open new dossiers if advantages are discerned.  
These characteristics of the Kremlin’s energy statecraft in Hungary are markedly present in 
three, possibly interrelated issues dominating the Hungarian energy landscape since 2012. 
 
South Stream 
Hungary pursued an intensive dialogue with Russia on South Stream from its public appearance 
in 2006 until its suspension in 2014. Excluding a short interruption between 2009 and 2012, 
Budapest remained deeply involved in the project and supported its realization. The 
construction was first promoted by the left-liberal Gyurcsány government, ruling the country 
until 2009. The-then opposition party Fidesz criticized South Stream forcefully, but changed its 
mind after its 2010 landslide electoral victory. By mid-2012, when Nabucco–West failed to win 
the race against the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, the Greece–Albania–Italy pipeline, Fidesz could 
publicly turn to South Stream as the only viable option for supply from the south.  
The national sections of South Stream had very similar patterns in each transit country. The 
main policy arguments in favor were better access to Russian gas, increased supply security by 
reducing transit risks, and strengthening the countries’ bargaining position in LTSC 
negotiations. At the same time, the project brought a regulatory clash with the European 
Commission: Gazprom refused to launch the usual regulatory approval procedure, while its 
contractual regimes with the transit countries, even the intergovernmental agreements, 
comprised several controversial points. This was most visible in the Bulgarian case, resulting 
in the suspension of the project. Gazprom was also relatively safe from project preparation 
risks: the unilateral cancellation of the project did not result in financial compensation for the 
transit states.  
Nonetheless, South Stream played the role of a catalyst of bilateral relations. Being a flagship 
project, its political preparations attracted the attention of local political elites and established 
a permanent system of high-level meetings and contacts. Unlike Bulgaria and Serbia, in 
Hungary Russia did not have a local web of middlemen capable of organizing a broad bilateral 
agenda. Especially in the case of Fidesz in 2012, relations had to be constructed from scratch, 
due to Viktor Orbán’s formerly anti-Russian attitude. Furthermore, Gazprom had no other 
platform to officially meet senior Hungarian decision makers. Since the whole gas value chain 
was privatized in Hungary by domestic and foreign companies, the government did not have a 
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full mandate to discuss gas-related matters. Formally, Gazprom and the government could not 
pursue negotiations on gas import prices without the inclusion of the E.ON management. 
Another factor enhancing exclusive talks was the separation of South Stream from the gas 
transmission operator into a state-owned entity in order to bypass the privately owned Mol. Not 
surprisingly, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán started a major nationalization campaign and raised 
MVM as a state-owned sectoral national energy champion, creating its “gas leg” right after his 
landslide electoral victory. There was a clear wish on the part of the Hungarian side to engage 
Russia in a broader set of gas issues, but it lacked the mandate and credibility until the end of 
Mr. Orbán’s first term. South Stream negotiations to some extent substituted this institutional 
deficit and accelerated the process of sectoral re-politicization.  
Even in the midst of this difficult start, Mr. Orbán’s government remained loyal to the project 
until the last moment. Its commitment to the project even led to a change in the national 
legislation, passed in early November 2014, circumventing EU law.22 The legal change allowed 
any company that is not necessarily certified as a gas transmission operator to build a gas 
pipeline, making Gazprom eligible for the construction of the South Stream project on 
Hungarian territory. The latter mirrors a Bulgarian parliament decision from April 2014 to adopt 
at first reading amendments in the country’s energy law, granting South Stream a special status 
as an interconnector project, thus avoiding the EU’s Third Energy Package. The whole issue 
became obsolete after the suspension of the construction by Russia.  
Since then, the issue of pipeline-building has remained a semi-official topic in Hungarian – 
Russian relations. It pops up regularly in different forms like the Tesla pipeline in 2015 or a 
murky interconnectivity project, where Bulgaria and Serbia are supposed to be already partners 
of Gazprom. What is common to these initiatives is that the Russian side keeps them extremely 
low profile, hardly anything is known about them, and there has not been any meaningful 
activity afterwards. Thus, these discussions lack a reasonable degree of credibility. Obviously, 
these pipelines still have a considerable role in bilateral negotiations, but it would be difficult 
to decide whether these are empty rhetorical undertakings or signal a more tangible 
commitment. 
 
Conveniently timed gas contract concessions 
The domestic policy shift from energy security considerations toward social affordability was 
to some extent imminent in most of the CEE countries, which revealed their higher vulnerability 
to Russian influence. Due to high oil and gas prices, combined with relatively low GDP per 
capita, the share of utility costs in citizens’ overall expenses in the Visegrád countries was 
almost twice higher than the respective share in Western Europe.23 For many low income 
households the payment of gas and electricity bills has been an everyday challenge. These social 
affordability considerations have thus contributed to a politically driven regulatory squeeze on 
the profitability of the utility sectors and partial renationalization at the corporate level. Not 
surprisingly, the rising gas import prices and their upward pressure on utility tariffs became a 
major issue on the political agenda in the early 2000s.  
It was the conservative Fidesz campaigning with the slogan of “cheaper gas,” while social-
liberal coalition governments tried to balance between economic reality and social 
considerations. Utility rate reduction became Fidesz’s electoral silver bullet, practically 
representing the single most prominent slogan by the end of the campaign. Presumably, it was 
the utility rate cut that boosted Fidesz’s popularity, which swelled from a low point of 1.3 
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million supporters in 2012 to 2.1 million by the time of the elections, granting Viktor Orbán a 
new constitutional majority.  
Simultaneously, as mentioned previously, the government succeeded in buying out E.ON 
from the wholesaler, holding the LTSC with Gazprom in October 2013. Through the purchase, 
the cabinet entered into a direct negotiation contact with Moscow. Fidesz had to face the 
controversy ensuring after the nationalization, whereby increased losses in the gas value chain 
had to be covered by state-owned corporations. Given the roughly EUR 1.7 billion annual 
turnover on the Hungarian gas market by that time, the utility rate cut would have created a 
sizeable deficit in the new owner’s (MVM) balances. In this situation, in 2013 Gazprom agreed 
to provide some beneficial modifications, granting Hungary a significant price concession. 
Close to the finalization of the Paks II credit line agreement, Gazprom committed itself to 
another set of concessions in February 2014, lowering the mandatory take-or-paylevels.24 This 
help became vital in managing the gas value chain amid the sharp utility rate reduction 
campaign.  
These concessions were not unprecedented in Western Europe but were rather uncommon 
in the CEE region. During 2012, many West European utilities renegotiated their LTSCs and 
brought them into line with market realities at the time. Nevertheless, in the CEE region, in the 
first half of 2012 prices varied between EUR 30 and 43 per MWh and in most of the cases their 
level exceeded Gazprom’s German export price by 15–40%.25 The take-or-pay concessions 
were of even bigger significance. As shown earlier, the Hungarian gas consumption virtually 
collapsed, falling from 13 to 8 bcm in less than a decade. Thus, Gazprom’s temporary flexibility 
and gradual release at these clauses brought a good deal of relief to the Hungarian side.  
All of these concessions came at a time when they had a high political relevance for Fidesz 
in the midst of its electoral campaign. The modifications also took place simultaneously with 
the Paks II negotiations, starting at the signing of the intergovernmental agreement26 in January 
2014, and followed by the agreement on the Russian credit line in March 2014.27 It would be 
difficult to state that Gazprom’s decision was completely unjustified, but its timing and 
relatively early action in a CEE comparative context suggest a good deal of preferential 
treatment. It is reasonable to assume that gas pricing concessions were not fully independent 
from these issues. 
 
The Paks project: a game changer 
The potential exchange of political favors between Hungary and Russia in commercial gas 
contracts, is dwarfed by the other major energy deal of this period – the Paks II project. In 2012, 
the Paks power plant generated 45.9% of the gross electrical power produced in Hungary, rising 
to 52.2% in 2015.28 These blocs were to be decommissioned after the expected end of their life 
cycle in the 2030s. Given their huge share in the electricity mix, the substitution of this capacity 
was of major importance for the country. Hungary does not have significant coal deposits, while 
the most plausible substitutes, natural gas and renewables, were considered to be expensive and 
unreliable. Thus, there was a strong support for nuclear energy among the industrial and 
governmental circles, and that renouncing it completely was considered an utterly heretical 
                                                 
24 Reportedly Gazprom offered a price discount above 10% in October 2013 and further, major takeover 
concessions in February 2014. Argus FSU Report. 2014. “Gazprom Eyes New Hungary Deal,” June. 
25 Regional Centre for Energy Policy Research (REKK). 2013. “Földgáz Nagykereskedelmi Modellalternatívák 
2015 Után Magyarországon,” p. 14. 
26 “Law No. II/2014,” 2014. 
27 “Law No. XXIV/2014,” 2014. 
28 Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority (MEKH). 2012. “A Magyar Villamosenergia-
Rendszer (VER) 2012. Évi Statisztikai Adatai.” 
Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority (MEKH). 2018. “Annual Data on Gross Electricity 
Production, 2014–2016.” 
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idea. Energy policy discussions have been long dominated by the “Paks only” argument. Policy 
debates about the necessity, timing, and the scale of these new blocs have been ruled out from 
the very beginning. The incoming Orbán government also signaled its wish to maintain nuclear 
capacity in the country in its 2011 National Energy Strategy.29  
Still, the deal between the Hungarian and Russian governments announced in January 2014 
was a major surprise for many. It had been prepared in total secrecy, without any public or 
political debates, lacking administrative and industrial justification. The agreement envisages 
the construction by Rosatom of two new reactors to be commissioned in the mid-2020s with a 
total capacity of 2,400 MW, worth EUR 12.5 billion. The overall value of the project exceeds 
12% of the current Hungarian GDP and raises many concerns related to the future opportunities 
entailed for Russian influence.  
The exact motivation for the sudden decision to implement a major nuclear construction 
project remains unclear. Given that the early launch of the new units is expected to be in 2025–
2027, six nuclear blocs will produce electricity simultaneously until 2032 (when the lifetime of 
the first existing Paks bloc constructed in 1982 expires). This is an opaque decision, causing 
further physical and financial uncertainties and complicating the feasibility of the new units. 
There was no time pressure to decide about the substitution of the old blocs and the nuclear 
option could have been left open until the early 2020s. Regulatory issues have been fully 
ignored especially as far as conformity to EU standards was concerned. The European 
Commission had launched several investigations regarding public procurement (the lack of 
tendering), potential state aid aspects, and transparency considerations (the past and future 
decisions related to the project were classified). Most of these pitfalls of the project have been 
successfully averted (at least by 2017), but at the time of the signature there was no certainty 
about the actual outcomes.  
The financial aspects also create a considerable set of problems. There have been no 
economic analyses of potential alternative options and the government failed to deliver 
evidence that the project would be profitable. Russia had been pushing for this project for at 
least five years. It offered a 40% localization rate, which in absolute terms would equal 
approximately 5 billion euros. It is highly questionable whether the Hungarian industry will be 
capable of delivering the requested quality in such a high proportion. Furthermore, the 
construction may boost the regional economy and provide some spillover effects of limited 
scale. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that only these sweeteners were sufficient to persuade the 
government for such a risky project.  
On the other hand, the financial burden is sizable. If the budget were to bear the entire cost 
of the project, it would have increased the deficit/debt as a share of GDP by 1.3% per year over 
the construction period. While this, or a combination of other financing solutions, does not seem 
to be impossible to bear for Hungary, it is obvious that there would be significant pressure to 
make budgetary adjustments, especially if the government is ruling out a steep increase in the 
power tariffs paid by households. Even so, the European Commission has already signaled that 
the project may cause tensions with the Commission’s Stability and Growth Pact and contribute 
to Hungary’s negative debt trajectory. The Russian credit line with its tiered interest rate of 
around 4–5% (in euro) gives only a partial relief in this regard, but increases the Russian 
bargaining power in the construction phase significantly.  
Moreover, hardly anything is known about project management. The government 
commissioner responsible for Paks II has argued that the contracts oblige Rosatom to deliver 
turnkey blocs by the deadlines, thus the risks on the Hungarian side are minimized.30 The three 
implementation agreements signed in December 2014 are fully classified with all the related 
past and future data for 30 years, according to a specific law passed by parliament. At the same 
                                                 
29 Ministry of National Development. 2012. “National Energy Strategy 2030.” 
30 hvg.hu. 2014. “Paks II.: A Garancia Az, Hogy ‘mi Sem Vagyunk Kispályások’,” December 9. 
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time, the Finnish nuclear safety regulator postponed the issuance of a permission for the 
construction of the same type of blocs in Finland by one year due to severe shortcomings in 
management, including engineering attitudes to safety and coordination problems with the new 
technical design.31 Rosatom’s Leningrad blocs had been planned to be laid by 2013 and 2016, 
respectively, but due to a variety of reasons, encompassing construction problems at the sites 
and capacity abundance on the market, the official deadline has been shifted to 2018 for the 
first unit.32 Because of similar reasons, the Baltic I project has been suspended, and the 
Novovoronezh II unit is expected to start commercial operation only after nine years of 
construction in 2019. Given the problems with Rosatom’s own projects and the relatively weak 
Hungarian project management record, the complexity of the project in terms of permits and 
other legal aspects, the management and sharing of project risks between the parties are of vital 
importance.  
The Fidesz government also resorted to extreme legislative measures to shield the Paks II 
project from public scrutiny. A bill adopted in March 2015 exempted the project from 
Hungary’s Freedom of Information Act, classifying all information related to the design, 
construction and funding of the two nuclear reactors for 30 years. The law cited unspecified 
national security interests and the protection of intellectual property rights in general as grounds 
for the blanket restriction that left no discretion for data controllers and rendered the option of 
judicial review of any refusal to gain access meaningless.33 The government was forced to 
partially retract these restrictions a year later after an EU Pilot procedure concluded that the 
amendment violated EU disclosure requirements.  
The corruption risks have to be highlighted in this regard. As detailed in an assessment by 
corruption experts commissioned by Energiaklub,34 a Budapest-based energy policy think tank, 
the risks common to all large infrastructure projects are in this instance compounded by 
shortcomings of the deal in question. International empirical studies on similar projects 
demonstrate that at least 5% of the value of such investments is exposed to corruption risks. 
Hungarian data suggest that the corresponding value may be as high as 13–16%, with higher 
priced investments being associated with higher corruption-related losses.35 A significant 
degree of information asymmetry arises from the heavy reliance on the expertise of the 
contractor regarding the complex technologies of which only it has full knowledge. This can be 
exploited by the Russian party through overpricing and a number of other means. Overpricing 
is also an issue when considering the high number of subcontracts such an investment project 
generates.  
Overall, the significance of the Paks II contract does not lie exclusively in its sheer size and 
long-term nature. At this stage, it is the single most solid element of the Russian presence that 
stretches Moscow’s influence well beyond the tenure of the incumbent government. It makes 
Russian influence more irreversible when an exit is very costly and ambivalent from the policy 
point of view. It creates a necessity for any future government to conduct complex negotiations 
with Russia and rely on Russian goodwill. Thus, it is reasonable to define Paks II as the axis of 
Russian energy statecraft. 
 
*** 
                                                 
31 Marja Ylonen, et al. 2017. “Evaluation of the Safety Culture of the Hanhikivi-1 Project Key Organizations: 
Fennovoima, RAOS Project and Titan-2.” 
32 Mycle Schneider, and Antony Froggatt. 2016. “The World Nuclear Industry – Status Report 2016.” 
33 Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ). 2015. “Hungary Classifies All Information Regarding Paks Nuclear 
Plant.” 
34 Mihály Fazekas, Zsolt Főző, and István János Tóth. 2014. “Az Atomerőmű-Beruházások Korrupciós 
Kockázatai: Mire Számíthatunk Paks-II Esetében?” Corruption Research Center Budapest. 
35 Mihály Fazekas, Zsolt Főző, and István János Tóth. 2014. “Az Atomerőmű-Beruházások Korrupciós 
Kockázatai: Mire Számíthatunk Paks-II Esetében,” Corruption Research Center Budapest, p. 3. 
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The overall question which remains is whether Russia’s energy statecraft in Hungary has 
irreversible features or is it only a temporary phenomenon that may disappear when political 
conditions change.  
First, it is important to note that the impetus for engagement came from both sides. It was 
not only Russia engaging Hungary, but also Budapest seeking access to Moscow. In this regard, 
the domestic image of Russia, Hungary’s threat perceptions and calculations about political and 
business compatibility were of major importance. The ruling elites still have high expectations 
with respect to this nexus despite the fact that changing economic, political, and security trends 
all point to the contrary. Indeed, notwithstanding the almost negligible activity in terms of 
Russian public procurement during the collapse of Hungarian exports after 2014, which was 
one of the expected factors for a breakthrough, Budapest still believes that the Russian 
connection may contribute to the diversification of the Hungarian economy. Moscow was very 
successful in identifying these windows of opportunity, perhaps even nurturing these beliefs 
and creating a fertile soil for its influence.  
Second, a successful transition from communism and smooth integration into Western value 
chains do not shield entirely against Russian leverage. Hungary still actively cooperates with 
Western multinationals, competes for their investments, sometimes successfully. Eastern 
contacts and relations with major investors come on the top of these achievements. The Russian 
economic nexus is not a substitute, but a supplement to the Western one. Unlike countries which 
focus on the service sector that turns out to be vulnerable in times of crisis, Hungary has a robust 
manufacturing sector in Western ownership. Nevertheless, these contacts proved to be 
insufficient for the Hungarian government and it wanted to create alternative networks and 
attract investment also from non-Western countries through political bargaining.  
Third, energy is the field where Russia can permanently preserve its credibility. This is 
important if the decision to launch a cooperation with Moscow has been taken. Positive 
receptivity is available and the ideological objectives in the two capitals at least partially 
overlap. The potential fear of the Russian capacity to influence domestic politics is, however, 
also present. In such a situation, energy ties can deliver the evidence that bilateral relations 
work and flourish. A realistic balance of economic relations would point toward a major 
downsizing of engagement with Russia. Nevertheless, Hungary still pursues an open foreign 
policy toward Moscow and energy relations obviously play a crucial role in it.  
Fourth, Western powers and institutions have little leverage to stop this process. Hungary 
has permanently provided the strategic minimum vis-à-vis the NATO and the EU and could 
even withdraw if the minimum is significantly exceeded. Consequently, its relations with 
Russia have remained in the pool of tolerated, even if not welcomed, policies. Budapest, under 
certain conditions, got the green light from the European Commission in all the sensitive issues 
related to the Paks II project; it could start a similar project with the Chinese in railway 
infrastructure. Bilateral talks have continued to be active despite the EU’s silent consensus not 
to invite Putin to EU territory. In this regard, Western diplomatic isolation and political signals 
simply failed to constraint Hungarian-Russian engagement. Since the government sees these 
strategic boundaries lying rather far ahead from their current position, the story does not seem 
to be over yet. 
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